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 In￿ ation and Economic Growth in Latin America:




In this paper we investigate the role of poor macroeconomic per-
formance, in terms of high rates of in￿ ation, in determining economic
growth in four Latin American countries between 1970 and 2007. The
empirical results, based on the relatively novel panel time-series analy-
sis, con￿rm the anecdotal evidence which suggests that in￿ ation has
had a detrimental e⁄ect to growth in the region. All in all, we high-
light the costs that in￿ ation has had on economic activity, and also
the importance of particular economic institutions which were imple-
mented in the 1990s￿ central-bank independence and ￿scal responsi-
bilities laws￿ in actually keeping in￿ ation under control in the region,
as a ￿rst step in the direction of sustained growth and prosperity.
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11 Introduction and Motivation
Latin America has been known for its display of high rates of in￿ ation, and
even bursts of hyperin￿ ation, in particular during its political transition in
the 1980s and in the ￿rst half of the 1990s, and also for presenting erratic
economic growth rates during roughly the same period of time. Some of the
countries following this, somehow destructive, pattern include; Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil and Peru. In most of these cases, macroeconomic stabilisation
took some time to take root, in fact stabilisation came only in the middle
of the 1990s with the implementation of particular economic institutions,
when, coincidentally enough, growth rates also started showing a positive
trend.
Given this background, we investigate the role of the poor macroeco-
nomic performance seen in the 1980s and early 1990s, in terms of high in￿ a-
tion rates, in determining economic growth in the region. More speci￿cally,
we use data from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Peru from 1970 to 2007,
and the relatively novel panel time-series analysis to study whether in￿ ation
played any role in growth in Latin America at the time or not.
The empirical results robustly suggest that, during the period investi-
gated, in￿ ation has not only been the main macroeconomic determinant of
growth in the region, but also that its e⁄ect has been clearly a negative
one on growth. It is therefore fair to say that the lack of certain economic
institutions (i.e., central-bank independence and ￿scal responsibility laws),
instruments which were implemented in the region only in the second half of
the 1990s, facilitated the process of generating easy money used to fund spi-
ralling public de￿cits, which eventually led to those hyperin￿ ationary bursts
in the region with all their consequences on economic welfare1.
In addition, the importance of acquiring a better understanding of the
hyperin￿ ationary episodes of the past is not only because we currently have a
protracted hyperin￿ ationary event in Zimbabwe, with all its consequences on
economic activity and welfare, but also because there is an ongoing debate
in countries like South Africa and Argentina on the role and e¢ cacy of
1For instance, Bittencourt (2009) investigates the case of the Brazilian hyperin￿ ation
of the 1980s and 1990s, and he suggests that the high rates of in￿ ation seen at the time
contributed to increase earnings inequality. Moreover, Easterly and Fischer (2001) suggest
that the poor from 38 countries consider in￿ ation to be a more pressing problem than the
rich, which suggests that the poor are the ones su⁄ering more with higher in￿ ation.
2independent central banks in conducting monetary policy.
The contribution of this paper to the literature is that, ￿rstly, we fol-
low the advice given by Fischer (1993) and restrict our sample to those
Latin American countries which su⁄ered hyperin￿ ationary episodes and er-
ratic growth in the 1980s to conduct a more disaggregated case study on
the subject. Secondly, we make use of principal component analysis to get
independent variables with more explanatory power in an attempt to re-
duce model uncertainty. Thirdly, we also follow the advice given by Bruno
and Easterly (1998) and make use of high-frequency data, without the usual
averaging, to better pinpoint the e⁄ects of in￿ ation on growth. Finally,
we take advantage of the novel panel time-series analysis, and explore the
cross-sectional and time-series variation in the data, so that we are able to
provide more reliable and informative estimates on the topic.
The remainder of the paper is as follows: the next subsection brie￿ y
reviews and inserts this paper within the previous literature. Section Two
describes the data and the empirical strategy used, and then reports and
discusses the results obtained. Section Three concludes the paper, it sum-
marises the work, and then it suggests some policy implications and also
some possible future work.
1.1 Related Literature
De Gregorio (1993) presents some early evidence using a panel of twelve
Latin American countries during the 1950-1985 period, and he suggests that
in￿ ation is detrimental to economic growth; and Fischer (1993) presents in-
ternational cross-sectional and panel data evidence to suggest that in￿ ation
outweights the Mundell-Tobin e⁄ect. It is worth noting that, given the date
of their publication, these two studies do not account for the hyperin￿ a-
tionary episodes in Latin America of the early 1990s, which would certainly
reinforce their results.
Furthermore, Barro (1995) makes use of cross-sectional analysis, and he
suggests that the high-in￿ ation countries in his sample drive the negative
e⁄ects of in￿ ation on growth; and Bullard and Keating (1995) make use of
VAR analysis to reach a similar conclusion (i.e., that in the high-in￿ ation
country in their sample, in￿ ation negatively a⁄ects growth).
Moreover, Clark (1997) con￿rms the above and suggests that there are
problems with cross-section regressions￿ because of the averaging￿ and that
3panel analysis might be the way forward; and Bruno and Easterly (1998)
suggest that, because of the averaging again, there is no long-run relationship
between in￿ ation and growth when using cross-sectional analysis. Neverthe-
less, they suggest that there is a negative relationship between in￿ ation and
growth when in￿ ation reaches their proposed 40% threshold.
In addition, Sarel, Gosh and Phillips, and Khan and Senhadji (1996, 1998
and 2001 respectively) con￿rm the above negative relationship between in￿ a-
tion and growth once in￿ ation reaches particular thresholds. More recently,
Sirimaneetham and Temple (2009) make use of an index for macroeconomic
instability, based on principal component analysis, and Bayesian Model Av-
eraging to deal with model uncertainty, and they suggest that macroeco-
nomic stability is a necessary condition for economic growth in a panel of
developing countries.
Ultimately, the literature suggests that high in￿ ation is detrimental to
growth (i.e., it either outweights the Mundell-Tobin e⁄ect, or it contributes
to increased macroeconomic uncertainty which negatively a⁄ects investment
and consequently growth), and in a region like Latin America￿ which has
su⁄ered from chronic income inequality￿ high in￿ ation and erratic growth
certainly display negative e⁄ects on overall economic welfare2.
Therefore, it is fair to say that this paper is a natural development of
the previous literature on the subject (i.e., we conduct a case study that
pinpoints in more detail the e⁄ects of severe macroeconomic instability on
economic activity, we avoid the averaging and make use of annual data and
panel time-series analysis so that we are able to capture more accurately
the role of the macroeconomic volatility seen at the time in Latin Amer-
ica on growth, and we attempt to reduce model uncertainty via principal
component analysis). It is therefore believed that we are able to provide
informative estimates so that our knowledge on those historical episodes are
somehow deepened.
2Other major contributions include Barro (1997), Easterly (2001), Fischer (2004) and
Easterly (2005), not to mention the numerous growth studies which include in￿ ation as the
main proxy for macroeconomic stability. Overall, most of these studies reach the conclusion
that macroeconomic instability is detrimental to economic growth. Alternatively, see
Temple (2000) for an early survey of the literature.
42 Data, Empirical Strategy, and Results
The data set used covers the period between 1970 and 2007, and four Latin
American countries, namely Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Peru (i.e., T = 38
and N = 4). The growth rates of the real gross domestic products per capita
(GROW) are provided by the Penn World Table (PWT) data set mark 6.3,
and the data on in￿ ation (INFLAT) come from the Bureaux of Census of
the four countries.
The control variables used include the government￿ s share in the real
GDP (GOV), which proxies for the size of government, the ratio of exports
and imports to real GDP (OPEN), as a proxy for economic openness, and the
ratio of investment to real GDP (INV ), all from the PWT ￿les. We also use
a measure of ￿nancial development (i.e., the ratio of the liquid liabilities to
GDP (M2)) from the World Bank￿ s World Development Indicators (WDI).
Moreover, we interact the average years of schooling of those aged 25
and over (from the Barro and Lee data set) with the percentage of the total
urban population (from the WDI ￿les) to construct an index for structural
development (DEV ), which is supposed to capture the fact that more devel-
oped societies tend to be not only more educated, but also more urbanised.
Furthermore, via spectral decomposition we are able to extract the unob-
served common factors of three normalised Polity IV variables (i.e., democ-
racy (DEMOC), constraints on the executive (XCONST), and political com-
petition (POLCOMP)), so that we end up with a proxy for political regime
characteristics (POL) which contributes to reduce model uncertainty, and
that presents more explanatory power. Basically, this proxy captures the
role of the political transitions taking place in Latin America in the 1980s.
Finally, we also extract the unobserved common factors amongst in￿ a-
tion, government￿ s share in the real GDP and the ratio of external debt
to GDP, and construct an index for macroeconomic stability (STABIL),
which contributes to reduce the dimensionality of a set of prospective cycli-
cal macroeconomic variables, and that presents more explanatory power.
For the sake of clarity, in Figure One we plot the data on GDP per capita
and in￿ ation rates in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Peru respectively, and
what we can see is that during the hyperin￿ ationary bursts of the 1980s,
GDP per capita presented sharp decreases in all four countries, just to re-
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Figure 1: GDP per capita and In￿ ation, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Peru, 1970-2007.
Sources: Penn World Table and Bureaux of Census. GDP is the GDP per capita and
Inflation is the in￿ ation rate.
Moreover, in Table One we present the correlation matrix of the variables
used, and in￿ ation and growth present negative and statistically signi￿cant
correlations to each other. The control variables present the expected signs
(i.e., bigger governments are known to be detrimental to growth, more open
economies tend to grow faster, investment, for being one of the main compo-
nents of GDP, is positively correlated to growth, and the measure of ￿nancial
development is positively correlated to growth as well as our measure of de-
velopment). Finally, the variable of political regime characteristics indicates
that the implementation of democracy in the region in the 1980s, which is
illustrated by a reduction in the index POL, was, in fact, detrimental to
growth in the region3.
3Bittencourt (2010) suggests that, because of the distributional con￿ ict and some pop-
ulist tendencies, some of the Latin American countries that transitioned from dictatorship
to democracy in the 1980s su⁄ered from severe macroeconomic instability at the time.
6Table 1: The Correlation Matrix: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Peru, 1970-2007.
GROW INFLAT GOV OPEN INV M2 DEV POL
GROW 1
INFLAT -.451* 1
GOV -.166* .333* 1
OPEN .044 -.379* -.633* 1
INV .244* -.118 .105 -.434* 1
M2 .104 -.299* -.165* .368* -.277* 1
DEV .017 -.056 -.141 .077 .334* .019 1
POL .100 -.142 .227* -.323* .379* -.423* -.384* 1
Sources: Penn World Table, Bureaux of Census, World Development Indicators, Barro
and Lee, and Polity IV. * represents signi￿cance at the 5% level.
Furthermore, in Figure Two we plot the OLS regression lines between
in￿ ation and growth in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Peru respectively, and
in all four countries the relationship is negative and statistically signi￿cant,
which indicates that perhaps there is an economic relationship between these
two variables.
All in all, this initial inspection of the data, with all its caveats, suggests
that the anecdotal evidence of high in￿ ation rates and erratic economic
growth in Latin America might well be correct (i.e., the data plots show
the sharp decline in income during the hyperin￿ ationary bursts, the statis-
tical correlation between in￿ ation and growth is negative and signi￿cant,
and ￿nally the OLS regression lines indicate a signi￿cant negative economic
relationship between in￿ ation and growth in the region).
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Figure 2: OLS Regression Lines between Growth and In￿ ation, Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil and Peru, 1970-2007. Sources: Penn World Table and Bureaux of Census.
Growth is the GDP growth rate and Inflation is the in￿ ation rate.
In terms of econometric modelling, since we have a T > N data set,
the empirical strategy used is based on the relatively novel panel time-series
analysis. Firstly, for non-stationarity in the country time-series we use the
Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS (2003)) test, which allows for heterogeneous
parameters and serial correlation. The IPS test consists of an augmented
Dickey-Fuller regression for each variable of each country, and these are then
averaged. The moments of the mean and variance of the average ￿ t are -1.46
and .63 respectively4.
Secondly, the issue of heterogeneity bias in dynamic T > N panels, which
is caused because, under wrongly assumed homogeneity of the slopes, the
disturbance term is serially correlated and the explanatory variables xs are
not independent of the lagged dependent variable yt￿1. This is dealt with
by the Swamy￿ s (1970) Random Coe¢ cients (RC) estimator, which gives
consistent estimates of the expected values5. Moreover, the one-way Fixed
4An alternative to IPS (2003) is the test by Levin, Lin and Chu (2002). However, this
test assumes parameter homogeneity, and therefore does not consider a possible hetero-
geneity bias present in the data.
5The Mean Group estimator, proposed by Pesaran and Smith (1995), is also an alter-
native. However, this estimator is sensitive to outliers, a problem not faced by the RC
estimator.
8E⁄ects (FE) estimator also provides consistent estimates in dynamic models
when T ! 1, but only when the slopes are homogeneous6.
All in all, these two estimators account not only for an important econo-
metric issue in dynamic T > N panels, but also for the fact that some of
these countries present di⁄erent levels of economic development and sophisti-
cation (e.g., Brazil and Argentina are known to be relatively more developed
than Peru and Bolivia).
Furthermore, some would justly argue that there is reverse causality
present (i.e., that higher growth is actually generating higher in￿ ation and
not the inverse). We therefore use the Fixed E⁄ects with Instrumental Vari-
ables (FE-IV) two-stage Least Squares estimator, with the index STABIL
as our identifying instrument for in￿ ation. This index is believed to capture
the role of the unobserved common factors amongst in￿ ation, government
size and external debt in, actually, predicting in￿ ation. The estimates pro-
vided by the FE-IV estimator are asymptotically consistent and e¢ cient as
T ! 1.
We therefore estimate static and dynamic models with di⁄erent pooled
estimators (i.e., the benchmark Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS),
Fixed E⁄ects, Random Coe¢ cients and Fixed E⁄ects with Instrumental
Variables estimators), so that di⁄erent econometric issues are dealt with and
more reliable estimates provided7. The estimated heterogeneous dynamic
equation is therefore as follows,
GROWit = ￿i + ￿iINFLATit + ￿iGOVit + ￿iOPENit + ￿iINVit
+"iM2it + ￿iDEVit + ￿iPOLit + ￿iGROWit￿1 + ￿it; (1)
in which GROW are the growth rates of the domestic GDPs, INFLAT are
the in￿ ation rates, GOV is the share of government in the GDP, OPEN is
a measure of economic openness, INV is the share of investment to GDP,
M2 is the share of the liquid liabilities to GDP, DEV is the interaction
term between education and urbanisation, and POL is the political regime
variable which consists of the common factors of DEMOC, XCONST and
POLCOMP.
6In addition, GMM-type estimators are not an alternative under T > N for the over-
￿tting problem. See Bond (2002).
7Zellner (1969) states that for static models all panel estimators give unbiased estimates
of the expected values.
9In addition, we deal with between-country dependence, which is believed
to happen through the disturbances being E(￿it￿jt) 6= 0. Given the nature
of the data, we make use of Zellner￿ s (1962) Seemingly Unrelated Regres-
sions (SUR) estimator, which presents greater e¢ ciency, the greater the
correlation amongst the disturbances. The SUR estimates di⁄erent coun-
try time series, which are then weighted by the covariance matrix of the
disturbances8. Moreover, this estimator provides rather insightful estimates
because it disaggregates the analysis even further than the pooled analysis,
so that we can have a more in-depth view of the e⁄ects of the hyperin￿ a-
tionary processes on growth in the region9. Equation Two illustrates the
equation estimated for each country,
GROWt = ￿t + ￿INFLATt + ￿GOVt + ￿OPENt + ￿INVt
+"M2t + ￿DEVt + ￿POLt + ￿GROWt￿1 + ￿t: (2)
In terms of results, ￿rstly, in Table Two we report the IPS statistics, and
they suggest that we can reject the null hypothesis of unit roots and accept
in favour of the alternative that at least one variable of each country is, in
fact, stationary. With that in mind, we do not have to incur in any further
data transformation, nor pursue cointegration analysis.
8An alternative to SUR is the Common E⁄ects Estimator proposed by Pesaran (2006).
However, N is assumed to be large and in our data set N = 4. Furthemore, Kapoor, M.,
H. H. Kelejian, et al. (2007) propose an estimator that also works best under the N ! 1
assumption.
9For a more thorough discussion about panel time-series analysis in general, see Smith
and Fuertes (2008) or Lee, Pesaran and Smith (1998).










The moments of the mean E and variance var of the average ￿ t are respectively: -1.43
and .62. Source: Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) and author￿ s own calculations.
Secondly, in Table Three we report the static and dynamic estimates
of INFLAT on GROW using the POLS, FE and RC estimators respec-
tively. All four estimates of INFLAT are negative and statistically sig-
ni￿cant against GROW. GOV presents mostly negative and signi￿cant
estimates, which con￿rms the fact that bigger governments tend to be detri-
mental to economic growth. INV , as expected, presents positive and mostly
signi￿cant e⁄ects on GROW. The other control variables do not present
clear-cut estimates in this instance. Moreover, the F* test indicates that
there is evidence of regional ￿xed e⁄ects and the Likelihood Ratio (LR) test
suggests heterogeneity of intercepts and slopes, which indicates that the FE
is the most appropriate estimator in the static case, and the RC the most
appropriate one in the dynamic case.
11Table 3: POLS, FE and RC Estimates of In￿ ation on Economic Growth, 1970-2007.
Static and Dynamic Models
GROW POLS (1) FE (2) FE (3) RC (4)
INFLAT -2.16 (-4.97) -1.90 (-4.46) -1.64 (-3.71) -1.71 (-2.37)
GOV -.1385 (-1.14) -.4023 (-2.42) -.3987 (-2.42) .0625 (.14)
OPEN -.0368 (-1.08) .0430 (.49) .0092 (.11) .1597 (.88)
INV .2353 (2.29) .3165 (2.93) .2926 (2.51) .2247 (.56)
M2 .0054 (.17) -.0361 (-.95) -.0339 (-.90) -.0734 (-.51)
DEV -.0035 (-1.47) -.0097 (-1.20) -.0060 (-.74) -.0266 (-.74)
POL -.3096 (-1.11) -.4095 (-1.29) -.3674 (-1.17) -.7463 (-1.26)
GROWt￿1 .1313 (1.56) .0595 (.41)
F test 7.38 9.49 8.93
F test* 4.88 3.97
R2 .26 .16 .23
LR test 26.17
Wald test 35.77
T-ratios in parentheses. Number of observations: NT = 152. The basic estimated
equation is GROWit = ￿i+￿iINFLATit+￿iGOVit+￿iOPENit+￿iINVit+
"iM2it+￿iDEVit+￿iPOLit+￿iGROWit￿1+￿it; in which GROW is the growth
rate of the real GDP, INFLAT is the in￿ ation rate, GOV is the government￿ s share
in the real GDP, OPEN is a measure of economic openness, INV is the investment
ratio to real GDP, M2 is the liquid liabilities ratio to real GDP, DEV is the interaction
of schooling and urbanisation, and POL is a proxy for political regime characteristics.
POLS is the Pooled Ordinary Least Squares, FE is the Fixed E⁄ects and RC the Random
Coe¢ cients estimators.
Thirdly, in Table Four we report the static and dynamic estimates of
INFLAT on GROW using the FE-IV estimator, and all INFLAT esti-
mates are negative and statistically signi￿cant in this case too. GOV con-
￿rms the fact that bigger governments tend to be detrimental to growth,
and INV con￿rms its positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect on growth. The other
controls do not present clear-cut e⁄ects this time either. Furthermore, the
identifying instrument, STABIL, is positive and statistically signi￿cant in
the ￿rst-stage regressions, and the F* test indicates evidence of country ￿xed
e⁄ects.
12Table 4: FE-IV Estimates of In￿ ation on Economic Growth, 1970-2007.
Static and Dynamic Models
GROW FE-IV (1) FE-IV (2)
INFLAT -4.07 (-2.58) -4.16 (-2.11)
GOV -.323 (-1.71) -.324 (-1.71)
OPEN -.059 (-.50) -.062 (-.52)
INV .226 (1.70) .236 (1.85)
M2 -.072 (-1.49) -.072 (-1.37)
DEV -.008 (-.97) -.008 (-.98)
POL -.851 (-1.84) -.865 (-1.66)
GROWt￿1 -.022 (-.15)
F test* 2.26 2.42
R2 .23 .23
T-ratios in parentheses. Number of observations: NT = 152. The basic estimated
equation is GROWit = ￿i + ￿INFLATit + ￿GOVit + ￿OPENit + ￿INVit +
"M2it +￿DEVit +￿POLit +￿GROWit￿1 +￿it; in which GROW is the growth
rate of the real GDP, INFLAT is the in￿ ation rate, GOV is the government￿ s share
in the real GDP, OPEN is a measure of economic openness, INV is the investment
ratio to real GDP, M2 is the liquid liabilities ratio to real GDP, DEV is the interaction
of schooling and urbanisation, and POL is a proxy for political regime characteristics.
The identifying instrument is the variable STABIL. FE-IV is the Fixed E⁄ects with
Instrumental Variables estimator.
Finally, when we disaggregate the analysis further and make use of the
SUR estimator that takes into account any between-country dependence
present in the data, the story the data are telling us does not change much.
In the ￿rst panel of Table Five INFLAT presents negative signs on growth
and most of the static estimates are statistically signi￿cant. Most of the
control variables do not present clear-cut estimates, although most GOV
estimates are negative, most INV estimates are positive, and most M2 es-
timates are negative10. The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test of independence
suggests that we can not accept the null hypothesis of between-countries
[in]dependence11.
10For instance, Rousseau and Yilmazkuday (2009) suggest that ￿nancial development
does not play the expected positive role on growth in high-in￿ ation countries.
11The IPS test reported in Table 2 above assumes the existence of between-country
13Furthermore, the second panel reports the dynamic estimates, and again
INFLAT presents mostly negative and signi￿cant e⁄ects in growth. GOV
and INV present their expected signs (i.e., bigger governments are detri-
mental to growth and investment has a positive e⁄ect in growth). The liquid
liabilities M2 present mostly negative e⁄ects, which is what is predicted in
countries with high rates of in￿ ation. The LM test of independence again
suggests that we can not accept the null hypothesis of between-countries in-
dependence in this case either, which validates the use of the SUR estimator
in this analysis.
It is worth saying that the only country not presenting statistically signif-
icant INFLAT estimates in this more disaggregated analysis is Argentina.
Using the information in Figure One, this is certainly because GDP per
capita and growth rates in Argentina were already experiencing negative
trends from the late 1970s onwards, probably because of the excessive po-
litical instability seen at the time in that country. Nevertheless, during
the hyperin￿ ationary events of the 1980s income and growth su⁄ered even
sharper reductions than in the 1970s.
In addition, the SUR analysis highlights the fact that the countries in the
sample have di⁄erent economic characteristics (e.g., Argentina and Brazil al-
ready possessed in the 1980s a fairly sophisticated indexation mechanism,
which could have minimised the welfare costs of in￿ ation on economic ac-
tivity). Nevertheless, in￿ ation kept its detrimental e⁄ect to growth not only
in less developed countries like Bolivia and Peru, but also to a fairly sophis-
ticated economy like Brazil.
independence. An alternative that considers the existence of between-country dependence
is proposed by Pesaran (2007), the cross-section IPS (CIPS) test. However, CIPS assumes
that N > 10 and we have N = 4 in our data set. It is therefore thought that the IPS test
in this case is slightly biased but still informative and the best alternative available.
14Table 5: SUR Estimates of In￿ ation on Economic Growth, 1970-2007.
SUR
GROW ARGENTINA BOLIVIA BRAZIL PERU
INFLAT -.9930 (-.83) -.9596 (-1.94) -2.61 (-2.48) -4.63 (-5.46)
GOV -.5975 (-1.93) .0623 (.19) 1.09 (1.77) -1.92 (-3.22)
OPEN -.0779 (-.19) .2443 (2.37) .2642 (.59) -.0650 (-.35)
INV .8439 (1.77) -.0639 (-.41) .0099 (.03) .3423 (1.98)
M2 -.2828 (-1.45) -.0405 (-.57) .2172 (2.39) -.2675 (-1.77)
DEV -.0012 (-.03) -.0056 (-.22) -.0880 (-2.07) -.0060 (-.53)
POL -1.36 (-2.67) .1784 (.42) -1.13 (-1.33) -1.06 (-1.78)
LM test 14.78
INFLAT -1.35 (-1.11) -.6259 (-1.50) -2.39 (-2.12) -5.20 (-5.10)
GOV -.4750 (-1.44) -.3126 (-1.00) .9720 (1.52) -1.91 (-2.99)
OPEN -.0636 (-.15) .1724 (2.00) .1751 (.36) -.1341 (-.70)
INV .9922 (1.80) -.0748 (-.58) .1755 (.42) .4486 (2.32)
M2 -.3235 (-1.61) -.0123 (-.21) .1895 (2.02) -.2720 (-1.79)
DEV .0044 (.09) -.0141 (-.66) -.0707 (-1.48) -.0028 (-.25)
POL -1.53 (-2.56) .1484 (.40) -1.06 (-1.18) -1.17 (-1.94)
GROWt￿1 -.1571 (-.99) .2186 (1.75) -.0135 (-.09) -.1182 (-.89)
LM test 11.66
T-ratios in parentheses. Number of observations: NT = 152. The basic estimated
equation is GROWt = ￿t+￿INFLATt+￿GOVt+￿OPENt+￿INVt+"M2t+
￿DEVt + ￿POLt + ￿GROWt￿1 + ￿t; in which GROW is the growth rate of the
real GDP, INFLAT is the in￿ ation rate, GOV is the government￿ s share in the real
GDP, OPEN is a measure of economic openness, INV is the investment ratio to real
GDP, M2 is the liquid liabilities ratio to real GDP, DEV is the interaction of schooling
and urbanisation, and POL is a proxy for political regime characteristics. SUR is the
Seemingly Unrelated Regressions estimator.
All in all, the estimates reported above indicate that the in￿ ation rates
clearly and robustly presented detrimental e⁄ects to economic growth in
those Latin American countries which experienced bursts of hyperin￿ ation
during their political transitions in the 1980s. It is also worth highlighting
that the only cyclical and structural variable presenting clear-cut e⁄ects in
growth was, in fact, in￿ ation, which suggests that macroeconomic perfor-
mance, given its extreme nature, was the main driving force behind economic
15activity at the time in the region. Furthermore, although these countries sta-
bilised their economies in the 1990s, the analysis conducted here highlights
the negative e⁄ects of in￿ ation on growth over the entire period. Finally,
in￿ ation did not discriminate between more and less developed economies in
the region (i.e., all countries in the sample were a⁄ected by high in￿ ation).
All the same, the above is potentially important in terms of economic
welfare, the macroeconomic instability seen at the time in the region reduced
growth, which usually has a ￿rst- and second-order impact on the poor via
higher unemployment, and subsequently increased poverty and inequality.
3 Concluding Observations
We investigated in this paper the role of macroeconomic performance, in
terms of in￿ ation rates, in determining economic growth in a panel of Latin
American countries that experienced hyperin￿ ationary episodes in the 1980s
and early 1990s. The results, based on the relatively novel panel time-series
analysis, suggest that in￿ ation was detrimental to growth in the region at the
time. More speci￿cally, amongst the cyclical and structural variables used in
the regression analysis, in￿ ation proved to be the only one presenting clear-
cut e⁄ects against growth, which highlights its central role in determining
economic activity in the region. Moreover, although in￿ ation has been under
control in Latin America for some time, overall it still presents detrimental
e⁄ects to economic activity, which highlights the importance of those hyper-
in￿ ationary bursts in distorting economic activity in a diverse region that
already su⁄ers from, among other things, chronic income inequality.
The quality of the evidence presented is, to a certain extent, boosted not
only because we focus on those countries which su⁄ered from hyperin￿ ation
in Latin America, but also because we use a novel proxy for macroeconomic
instability based on principal component analysis, which is believed to be a
step forward since it reduces model uncertainty and has more explanatory
power. Moreover, we avoid the averages and take advantage of the novel
panel time-series analysis, which deals with important empirical issues not
covered by the previous studies, such as heterogeneity bias in dynamic pan-
els, economic endogeneity and between-country dependence. It is therefore
believed that the analysis conducted here represents a step forward in terms
of achieving better and more insightful estimates, and therefore in improving
16our knowledge on the subject.
The historical importance and topicality of carrying out a study on in-
￿ ation and growth is that, ￿rstly, as we speak a country like Zimbabwe
has been experiencing a severe hyperin￿ ationary episode for a rather pro-
longed period of time, with all its consequences on economic activity and
welfare. Secondly, in a country like South Africa, which possess an indepen-
dent central bank, there is an ongoing debate about the e¢ cacy, and even
legitimacy, of such an economic institution in conducting monetary policy
and its impact on growth. Thirdly, Argentina has also recently been debat-
ing the role of its own central bank and governor in conducting monetary
policy. Therefore, the lessons of past hyperin￿ ationary episodes and their
e⁄ects on economic activity must be not only learned and well understood,
but also kept in the minds of policy makers and other stakeholders, so that
the mistakes of the past are not repeated again.
Regarding future work, on the one hand the issues of nonlinearities and
thresholds can be investigated. On the other hand, a comparison between
the four Latin American countries studied here with the four Asian Tigers,
which presented macroeconomic stability and fast economic growth, would
certainly enrich this sort of analysis further; or a comparison between these
four Latin American countries with some of the Eastern European transition
economies, which also presented bursts of hyperin￿ ation in the 1990s, would
further our knowledge of in￿ ation and growth, and also of the determinants
of these distinct hyperin￿ ationary episodes in these particular regions.
To conclude, the Latin American hyperin￿ ationary experience is infor-
mative because it exempli￿es an interesting pattern seen in the region at
the time. Most Latin American societies that went through political tran-
sitions and which still did not have the right economic institutions such as
an independent central bank conducting sound monetary policy and a cred-
ible ￿scal authority in place, ended up experiencing traumatic episodes of
hyperin￿ ation, which a⁄ected mainly the welfare of the poor. Moreover,
coincidentally enough, macroeconomic stabilisation came only when those
countries introduced central bank independence, in￿ ation targeting and ￿s-
cal responsibility laws in the 1990s12.
12For instance, Singh (2006), Singh and Cerisola (2006) and Santiso (2006) highlight the
importance of the much improved macroeconomic performance in Latin America recently
to produce better economic outcomes from the 1990s onwards. Nevertheless, Carstens
and JÆcome (2005) warn that Brazil still has one of the least independent central banks
17Ultimately, the lesson here is that political liberalisation processes in
developing countries should be accompanied by the implementation of the
right economic institutions, so that the cost of generating high in￿ ation
is increased in the ￿rst place and macroeconomic factors do not become
impediments to economic growth and prosperity.
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